The Hidden Recognition

for the

Navajo Code Talkers

During the Pacific portion of World War II, increasingly frequent instances of broken codes plagued the United States Marine Corps. Because the Japanese had become adept code breakers, at one point a code based on a mathematical algorithm could not be considered secure for more than 24 hours. Desperate for an answer to the apparent problem, the Marines decided to implement a non-mathematical code; they turned to Philip Johnston's concept of using a coded Navajo language for transmissions.

Although this idea had been successfully implemented during World War I using the Choctaw Indian's language, history generally credits Philip Johnston for the idea to use Navajos to transmit code across enemy lines. Philip recognized that people brought up without hearing Navajo spoken had no chance at all to decipher this unwritten, strangely syntactical, and guttural language (Navajo). Fortunately, Johnston was capable of developing this idea because his missionary father had raised him on the Navajo reservation. As a child, Johnston learned the Navajo language as he grew up along side his many Navajo friends (Lagerquist 19). With this knowledge of the language, Johnston was able to expand upon the idea of Native Americans transmitting messages in their own language in order to fool enemies who were monitoring transmissions. Not only did the Code Talkers transmit messages in Navajo, but the messages were also spoken in a code that Navajos themselves could not understand (Paul 7).

This code actually proved vital to the success of the Allied efforts in World War II. Because the Code Talkers performed their duty expertly and efficiently, the Marines could count on both the validity and the timely transmission of their messages. Also, since the Japanese could not break the Navajo's code, the Marines were able to radio actual troop positions, ask for air support or supplies, and call for reinforcements without the fear of jeopardizing the safety of their men. Additionally, the Japanese could not imitate the code. Consequently, there was never fear that the Marines might receive fake communications. The services these Code Talkers provided not only saved many lives, but, according to some, actually had a huge effect on the outcome of many battles. Maj. Gen. Robert Magnus, commander of Marine Corps Air Bases, claimed "there was a dramatic reduction in Marine casualties" due to the usage of the Code Talkers (qtd. in Bond 3). In fact, Sharon Bond, a writer for the St. Petersburg Times, recently declared that, "On Iwa Jima… the Marines could not have taken the island without [the Code Talkers]" (Bond 3).

Sadly enough, the Navajos returned home after these successes unable to tell their stories or receive recognition for their efforts because the government had classified the work Top Secret. It was not until 1969 that the Code Talkers received some public recognition for their achievements. But, for nearly the next twenty years, very little was known about them. In the 1980's, though, a strong public appeal to decorate the Code Talkers for their World War II work resulted in President Reagan declaring August 14^th National Code Talker Day (Shaffer 2). Even considering this national honor, the debate still continues over whether the Code Talkers should each be given the Congressional Medal of Honor to compensate for their lack of recognition. Overlooked is the dramatic, although unheralded, change in the government's attitude toward the Navajo cause and the resulting reservation improvements. In fact, unbeknownst to the public, the United States government directly rewarded the Code Talkers for their valiant service with reservation improvements outlined in the Long Range Navajo Improvement Plan, including emergency financial aid, improved living conditions, and improved educational facilities.

Even though the Code Talkers had to contend with many anti-Indian prejudices, after they demonstrated their skills they became one of the most revered groups in the military. At first, many Marines treated the Code Talkers very poorly. Some Marines did not realize the Code Talker's role in the military and actually used them as runners instead of having them transmit messages (Bond 3). In fact, many soldiers at first mistook the Navajo for Japanese over the airwaves. Some soldiers thought the Japanese had begun to transmit on American frequencies. Because this caused such a commotion, one colonel forced a team of Code Talkers to demonstrate their skills in a race against another soldier transmitting normally (Eyewitness 317). If that team of Code Talkers had not finished this typical two-hour job in less than five minutes, the group would have been sent back to the headquarters so that there would not be any more confrontations between them and the infantry (Eyewitness 317). Respect for the Navajos blossomed after the soldiers realized the Navajo's importance. In fact, the Flagstaff Coconino Sun explained, "Out of the combination of the modern fighting tactics of the Marines and the inherent fighting ability of the Indians is evolving one of the hardest-hitting units of the hard-hitting Leatherneck Corps" (qtd. in Paul 101).

When the Code Talkers returned home they had to contend with a destitute reservation. Like the rest of the country, the Navajos had fallen upon hard times during the Great Depression. Fortunately, New Deal programs such as the Civilian Conservation Corps and the Public Works Administration supplied many Navajos with jobs during the early 1930's (Krug 5). This was particularly important because the government had limited the amount of cattle on Navajo land to an amount that would not damage the soil and cause irreversible damage to the reservation (Department of the Interior 7). The New Deal programs were able to keep the Navajos above the subsistence line for awhile, but without these programs the reduction of cattle would have caused terrible problems to the overcrowded and undernourished population. Eventually, the New Deal programs ran out of money, and the Navajo people drifted back into poverty.

Not only was the Navajo reservation extremely poor, but the general health conditions of the Navajo people were deplorable. Their lack of resources led to inanition, one of the major causes of death to the Navajo people. This "slow death by starvation" demonstrates the inhumane conditions the Navajo experienced and also shows the government's initial attempt to ignore the Navajos and their problems (McColm 1). In addition to this problem of starvation, tuberculosis and other diseases were prevalent on the Navajo reservation. In 1948 there were an estimated 5000 cases of tuberculosis, and the infant mortality rate was 30% (Sanchez 17). Not only was the prevalence of disease high on the reservation, but the facilities for treatment were also terrible. There were no visiting doctors employed on the reservation, nor were there adequate places to receive treatment for maladies (Sanchez 17). In fact, the conditions of the Navajo people were not fit for civilized humans to live.

The end of World War II exacerbated the horrible living conditions of the Navajo. During the war, many Navajos found steady incomes in the military or in unskilled jobs created off of the reservation by the war. The end of the war stopped the flow of money into the reservation. Laborers lost their now unnecessary jobs, and no longer could send portions of their incomes home to their families. Actual participants in the war, Code Talkers included, no longer received their pay, and therefore had no money to send home to the reservations. Since they could not be successful off of the reservations, many Navajos returned home to more desperate conditions than the reservation had ever faced before. One can imagine that these conditions were particularly hard for many of the Code Talkers to understand. After being such an important part of the American victory in the Pacific, they resented their return to squalor with no recompense for their valiant efforts. The Code Talkers returned home to a reservation riddled with disease, plagued by starvation, and as poor as possible—it was hardly a hero's welcome.

Not only did the Code Talkers return to a dying reservation, but they also returned to high anti-Indian sentiment. Local governments that refused to grant Native Americans voting rights only promoted this racism. The State of Arizona extended suffrage to Navajos in 1948, but New Mexico did not follow until 1953 (Bond 2). Aside from the right to vote, the Navajos simply wanted respect that was not possible due to racism. Navajos, such as Wade Hadley, wished to return home to the same treatment they had been given on the battlefield:

"As far as the army is concern, everybody is being treated the same… I can drink in the public bars any time I please. Because I risk my life in the front line for it. There for I should have the privilege. This deal should continue after the war… I know the other nationality are not better human being that we are" (qtd. in Nash 143).

Hadley's remarks show that the Navajos were not treated with the same respect on the reservation as at war. In fact, Carl Gormon, Code Talker turned artist, wrestled with this lack of respect in many of his paintings, particularly "Not Allowed" (See figure 1). In this painting, a Native American, dressed in a military uniform, is not being served in a bar due to his race. Above the bar there sits a stereotypical picture of a native in a headdress with the words "Not Allowed" underneath. In this painting from the 1950's, Gormon expresses his anger at discrimination. He demonstrates the helplessness that Native Americans felt. Since the government did not release information on the Code Talkers, the average American was not aware of the amazing job the Navajos had performed and consequently had no reason to adjust personal prejudices. The restraint in their everyday lives caused by anti-Indian sentiment may have been lifted if the government had released the information on the Code Talkers and given the ignorant American public a reason to change its collective views.

While the terrible conditions of the Navajo reservation may have called for improvements, only when the disgruntled Code Talkers in conjunction with other Navajos approached Congress did the government take action. In 1946, a band of Navajos organized by the Tribal Council, including a group of Code Talkers, went to Congress to plead for aid on behalf of the Navajo people (Nash 147). One of the arguments the Navajos presented was that of a former Code Talker:

We went to hell and back for what? For the people back here in America to tell us we can't vote? Can't do this! Can't do that! because you don't pay taxes and are not citizens! We did not say we were not citizens when we volunteered for service against the ruthless and treacherous enemies, the Japs and the Germans! (Nash 147)

The Code Talkers felt that they should somehow be compensated for their war efforts.

Federal involvement followed shortly after the Navajo trek to Washington. In 1947, the Bureau of Indian Affairs sent Elizabeth Chief and George McColm to the Navajo Reservation to write the "Navajo Welfare Report," a report on the conditions of the Navajo tribe at the time. This report appears to directly follow from the Navajo appeal to Washington. If so, the Navajos were specifically singled out for aid because of their appeal to the government. In this case, it seems reasonable that the presence of former Code Talkers amongst that group of Navajos had an effect on Congress as well. Members of Congress would have been briefed on the Code Talkers' importance in World War II.

The Navajo's reason for approaching Congress was to ask for funds to improve reservation schools, as well as to confront the lack of health care and opportunity on the reservation. The lack of educational opportunities was a major problem for the Navajo Indians. In fact, 88% of the Navajo reservation residents could not write their own names (Sanchez 25). These illiterate Navajos qualified for few jobs on or off the reservations.

Even though the Navajos were largely uneducated, they can not be blamed for their lack of education; before major government intervention their resources were minimal. Since 1868, the government had been responsible for providing proper resources to educate Navajos as part of the terms of a treaty (Sanchez 13). However, the government did not follow through with this until after the Code Talkers addressed Congress. Before the trek to Washington in 1948, the educational facilities on the reservation could only support approximately 7,500 Navajo children out of a group of 24,000 (Krug VII). Problems, including the sparse population and the lack of water resources, resulted in the government constructing boarding schools to educate the Navajo children cost-efficiently. These boarding schools promoted Navajo apathy toward schooling by separating children from their families and oftentimes moving them far away. Many Navajos chose not to attend these schools or did not contest the lack of room because of the deplorable conditions of the schools. At one boarding school, Chinle, "The walls of an old stone building [were] kept from collapsing by large timbers propped up against a teetering corner" (Sanchez 28). Given the terrible conditions of the Navajo school system, it is not surprising that so few Navajo children attended school.

As a result of the Navajo visit to Congress, the Long Range Program for Navajo Rehabilitation specifically addressed the poor education of Navajo Indians by pledging to increase the school capacity to accommodate all of the Navajos. The government accomplished this through repair and expansion of present schools and by building two new boarding schools (Krug 42). These actions appear successful because by 1960 the percentage of Navajo children in school had risen to 86% (Department of the Interior 30).

In addition to establishing educational facilities for the Navajo children, as a part of the Navajo improvement plan the government also provided education for the older Navajos in the form of on-the-job training. The government established many of these facilities so that Navajos could make money, learn a trade, and at the same time be taught English. In fact, according to The Long Range Navajo Plan, "Adult education in the form of on-the job training will also be a primary goal in all phases of the construction work" (Krug 42). Through work-study programs like this, the Navajos were able to obtain a higher level of general education and still provide for their families, while acquiring skills that would benefit them later in life in the form of better jobs on or off the reservation.

In addition to these educational intensive jobs, the government's Navajo improvement plan after World War II also created many job opportunities on the reservation for the Navajos. These jobs compensated for the defunct New Deal programs and for the end of the war industry. Because the reservation was in such disrepair, much money needed to be spent on construction. Of this 11.5 million dollars, half was paid directly to Navajos for their participation in the labor involved in building the new power plant, new roads, and even a canal extension (Krug 33). In this way, the Navajos benefited both directly and indirectly. The government improved their reservation, and the Navajos were paid to do the work. On top of this, the government also provided many opportunities for off reservation jobs and resettlement.

By adopting the Long Range Navajo Rehabilitation Project, the government also increased the amount of health care provided to the Navajos, vastly improving on their conditions. In addition to simply updating deteriorating hospitals, the Long Range Navajo Improvement Plan outlined nearly five million dollars worth of health care improvements (Krug 39). Money was allocated for a new hospital to be built, for the construction of many local Health Centers, and for a Tuberculosis Sanatorium (Krug 39). The local Health Centers dispersed across the reservation were necessary to provide treatment to the Navajos not near any particular town or hospital. Having more medical centers farther away from major towns provided more services and also made it easier for the Navajos to get to a facility when necessary. The Tuberculosis Sanatorium also was a key health issue in the Navajo Improvement Plan. Tuberculosis was common on the Navajo reservation due to its lack of treatment. Providing more treatment for the disease not only saved more Navajo lives, but also prevented the spread of this dangerous disease as well. Although the tuberculosis rate amongst Navajos was still 10 times higher than the rate off of the reservation, the government succeeded in reducing the number of cases per year to about 625 in 1955, and then to 225 by 1960 (Department of the Interior 41). This was an amazing improvement from the 5000 cases per year before government intervention.

While the evidence is mainly circumstantial, one can argue that the United States' support of the Navajos after World War II had some direct link to the Code Talkers' involvement in the war. The Code Talkers' work did command respect from all who knew about their involvement. In fact, according to George McColm, "Congressional respect for the Navajos, generated by the outstanding loyal service of both military and civilian members of the tribe during World War II resulted in appropriations that improved the life of every Navajo" (McColm 5). This appears clear when one examines the state of the Navajo reservation before and after the war. It is no coincidence that the Navajos received so much aid in such a timely fashion following World War II. The government may have promised to take care of the Navajos in 1868 when the tribe was moved to its present location, but only in 1948 did the government truly take measures to care for the Navajos. This piece of evidence, coupled with an interesting quote from the preface to the Long Range Navajo Rehabilitation Project, shows that the relationship between the Code Talkers and the reservation improvements is causal. According to Julius Krug, the "Navajos were widely recognized for their excellent work as fast, secret communicators (using the Navajo language) in the critical amphibious operations in the Pacific theater" (Krug 1). During the writing of his plan in 1948, Mr. Krug may not have been able to call them Code Talkers, but he certainly knew the Navajos' role in World War II and must have taken it into account when writing his recommendation for Navajo improvement.

The decision for the Navajo to fight for their country appears even more noble when one takes into consideration the way the government treated the Navajos in the years leading up to World War II. As a part of the process to force the Navajos (and other Native Americans as well) to assimilate into American culture, schools teaching Navajos would not allow the students to conduct any classes, or sometimes even conversations, in their native tongue. Carl Gormon fell subject to this treatment. At one point he "was chained in the school basement for three days with only bread and water" as punishment for speaking in Navajo (Bond 2). Aside from the simply outrageous nature of this punishment, the fact that during Gormon's lifetime he was both punished and applauded for his native language seems very ironic.